In the winter of 1863-1864 during the American Civil War, Major General Ulysses S. Grant, then-commander of the Division of the Mississippi, consisting of the combined Federal Armies of the Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland, met his match in the form of a cipher book and key. |
Major General Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Division
of the Mississippi at the time of the “Washington Ciper” affair in
January-February 1864. (Photo: Library of Congress)
|
Grant
looked to travel from his Division’s headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee to
Knoxville in late-1863 to personally inspect the existing state of military affairs
in East Tennessee. At the time, Federal Major General Ambrose Burnside
(eventually supported by reinforcements under Brigadier General William
Tecumseh Sherman) continued to fend off an ill-supplied, ill-supported, and
ultimately ill-fated Confederate foray into East Tennessee led by Lieutenant General
James Longstreet. There was one significant problem for Grant though: he deemed
it necessary to have a person accompany him on this trip who was capable of
sending and receiving enciphered dispatches.[i]Enter
Samuel Beckwith, a telegraphic cipher clerk with the U.S. Military Telegraph
Corps (USMTC) and assigned to Grant. The USMTC, established October 1861, was one of
two Federal army signaling operations during the Civil War; the other being the
Signal Corps (not officially established until March 1863). The USMTC leveraged
the existing commercial telegraph systems for the War Department to facilitate
communications between Federal armies in the field and Washington. The USMTC
operated independently from military control, with its personnel makeup
consisting of civilian telegraph operators and some supervisory personnel with
military commissions from the Quartermaster Department, all under the direct
supervision of the Secretary of War.
As
events turned out, Beckwith came to be so closely associated with Grant that
other staff officers nicknamed him “Grant’s Shadow.” Secretary of War, Edwin M.
Stanton, who oversaw the USMTC and always kept a tight hold on its operations, intended
for Beckwith to accompany Grant wherever he went so that the Major General
could always rely on the clerk to facilitate secret communications between him
and the War Department in Washington. By January 1864, these particular communications
were enciphered using “a new and very complicated cipher,” as
then-General-in-Chief of all Union armies, Major General Henry W. Halleck characterized
it.[ii]
 |
Captain Samuel Beckwith, the USMTC cipher clerk known as
"Grant's Shadow," in his later years. (Photo: Library of
Congress) |
The USMTC cipher system leveraged what were
commonly known during the Civil War as “route ciphers.” In an article published
in September 1889, a former USMTC operator, John Emmet O’Brien, concisely
described how the route cipher worked: “The principle of the cipher consisted
in writing a message with an equal number of words in each line, then copying
the words up and down the columns by various routes, throwing in an extra word
at the end of each column, and substituting other words for important names and
verbs.” In 1960, the dean of modern American cryptologists, William F.
Friedman, analyzed the USMTC cryptosystem and concluded that the writing,
copying, and use of a cipher book to apply a prearranged route to transcribe
the plaintext into a cipher message qualified it to be a called a cipher. That
said, Friedman maintained that the addition of “arbitraries” to the USMTC
cryptosystem—“words arbitrarily assigned to represent the names of persons,
geographic points, important nouns, and verbs, etc.”—actually entitled the
system to be more precisely characterized as a code system comprised of “cipher
and code processes.”[iii]
That
said, Grant’s problem, as he recognized it, was that his Knoxville trip not
only required he keep a skilled telegraphic operator in Nashville—the relay chokepoint
for secret dispatches between him and the War Department—but that he also bring
along a capable operator to send and receive enciphered messages from
Knoxville. He could not have Beckwith in both Knoxville and Nashville, so Grant
did what might be considered the next logical thing under less secretive
circumstances and told his “shadow” to remain in Nashville, while instructing
him to simply hand over a copy of the complicated “Washington cipher” to a
person Grant trusted and believed capable of quickly learning how to handle enciphered
messages. That person turned out to be Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock of the Corps
of Engineers and a member of Grant’s staff.
 |
Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock, the officer who was handed an
unauthorized copy of the "Washington Ciper." (Photo: Library
of Congress) |
Yet,
as events turned out, Grant’s plan was neither simple to implement nor
compliant with War Department instructions. For one, Beckwith initially refused
to comply with Grant’s request to give a copy of the cipher book and key to Comstock.
According to Grant, the clerk told him “his orders from the War Department were
not to give it [the cipher book and key] to anyone –the commanding general or
any one else.” Following this rebuttal, a tense, stand-off ensued between
Beckwith and Grant, whereby according to the Division commander, “I told him I
would see whether he would [give up the book and key] or not. He said that if
he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most certainly would
be punished.” Finally, as Grant later recounted, Beckwith “[saw] that
punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order” and ultimately
“yielded” upon recognizing that no one from the War Department was present to
support his refusal.[iv]
Though
Grant unsurprisingly came out the victor in this stand-off with the cipher
clerk, his desired outcome was certainly not the end of the matter. Soon
enough, word got back to USMTC leadership, Stanton, and Halleck about what had
transpired.
Between
January 20 and February 4, 1864, a steady flurry of messages was traded between
Grant and Halleck—perhaps more truthfully stated, between Grant and Stanton,
with Halleck as intermediary—whereby the Division commander was asked to
justify his actions before ultimately being reprimanded. After explaining what
happened and attempting to reassure Halleck that “I shall be as cautious as I
possibly can, that improper persons do not get the key to official
correspondence,” Grant moved on to protesting what he deemed to be
“interference” from Colonel Anson Stager, the Superintendent of the USMTC and
essentially Stanton’s deputy. Shortly after learning Beckwith had conceded
defeat and intended to hand over the cipher to Comstock, Stager sent the
following dispatch to Captain Samuel Bruch, the assistant superintendent of
Grant’s Mississippi Division: “Beckwith must not instruct anyone in the cipher.
An order will be issued and sent to you on this subject.”
Seeing
Grant characterize his dispatch to Bruch as “interference,” Stager determined
to defend his actions and wrote Halleck on January 21. Stanton’s deputy for the
USMTC emphasized his belief “that the request of the staff officer for copy of
the cipher was without General Grant’s authority,” while reminding Halleck,
“The Secretary of War recently issued that the operators for this duty should
be held responsible for strict privacy in its use….The new cipher was arranged
with a view of being used by telegraph experts, and it is believed cannot be
used with any success by others than telegraphers.” Stager further drew
attention to his impression that “a great number of errors have been made by
staff officers working ciphers, owing to their lack of experience in
telegraphic characters, and it is believed that greater accuracy can be secured
by placing ciphers in the hands of experts selected for this duty.” Once again
stressing that the Washington cipher “arranged for General Grant should not be
known to any other party,” Stager vented that he was “exceedingly mortified”
and suffered from an “anxiety” about letting Beckwith continue on with his
operator duties under Grant.
 |
Colonel Anson Stager, Superintendent of the USMTC. (Photo: Library of Congress) |
With
Stager’s views in hand and undoubtedly upon informing and consulting the
hot-tempered Edwin M. Stanton, Halleck prepared Grant’s reprimand, which landed
on the Division commander’s desk on January 22. Grant was informed that in complying
with his request, Beckwith “disobeyed the Secretary and has been dismissed.”
Perhaps relaying some of Stanton’s fury, Halleck went further and intimated that
Beckwith actually “should have gone to prison,” while repeatedly reminding Grant
that Stanton “takes the personal supervision and direction of the military
telegraphs” with the “telegraphic operators receiv[ing] their instructions
directly from the Secretary of War.” These instructions “should not be
interfered with except under very extraordinary circumstances,” Halleck
declared. Adding insult to injury, Halleck used Grant’s own word “interference”
against him, pronouncing that it was not Stager, but Comstock (and by
extension, Grant) who “interfered with the orders of the War Department,” while
reminding Grant (again with it being hard not to hear echoes of Stanton behind
this verbiage) that Stager was no less than the “confidential agent of the
Secretary of War, and directs all telegraphic matters under his orders.”
Finally, Grant was informed that because of this unauthorized disclosure, the
Secretary of War ordered an entirely new cipher created “which is to be
communicated to no one, no matter what his rank, without his [Stanton’s]
special authority.”
Grant
replied in an apologetic and gracious manner on February 4, making it amply
clear that his primary focus was on restoring Beckwith to his cipher clerk
duties. “I will state that Beckwith is one of the best of men. He is competent
and industrious,” Grant highlighted, before putting the blame for the error on
himself and not Beckwith: “In the matter for which he has been discharged, he
only obeyed my orders and could not have done otherwise than he did and remain….His
position is important to him and a better man cannot be selected for it. I
respectfully ask that Beckwith be restored.” Grant’s compassionate response was
a testament to his paramount leadership abilities. Indeed, just less than a
month after the conclusion of this trying episode, Grant was promoted to
lieutenant general, the first U.S. Army officer to hold that rank since George
Washington. For the remainder of the war, Grant would command all Union armies.[v]
As
for Beckwith, he was restored to his position on February 14 and continued on
as “Grant’s shadow” until the end of the war, rising to the rank of captain in
the 11th New York Infantry. Significantly, Beckwith was the first
telegrapher to transmit news of John Wilkes Booth’s whereabouts as authorities
searched for him following the assassination of Abraham Lincoln on April 14,
1865.[vi]
Notes
[i] Ulysses S. Grant, Personal
Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, 397-398.
[ii] The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
128 vols. (Washington D.C. 1880-1901), Series 1, vol. 32, pt. 2, 172; Hereafter
cited as OR. All references are to Series 1 unless otherwise noted; The
Friedman Legacy: A Tribute to William and Elizebeth Friedman, 3rd Edition,
(Center for Cryptologic History: National Security Agency, 2006), 58-59.
[iii] John Emmet O’Brien, M.D., Telegraphing in Battle: Reminiscences of the Civil War, (Scranton, PA, 1910), 87; The Friedman Legacy, 58-59.
[iv] Grant, Personal Memoirs, 397-398. [v] OR 32/2: 150, 161, 172-173, 323
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