Friday, June 11, 2021

The Grant-Beckwith “Washington Cipher” Affair: “He Should Have Gone to Prison” - By: Cory M. Pfarr

In the winter of 1863-1864 during the American Civil War, Major General Ulysses S. Grant, then-commander of the Division of the Mississippi, consisting of the combined Federal Armies of the Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland, met his match in the form of a cipher book and key.
Major General Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Division of the Mississippi at the time of the “Washington Ciper” affair in January-February 1864. (Photo: Library of Congress)

Grant looked to travel from his Division’s headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee to Knoxville in late-1863 to personally inspect the existing state of military affairs in East Tennessee. At the time, Federal Major General Ambrose Burnside (eventually supported by reinforcements under Brigadier General William Tecumseh Sherman) continued to fend off an ill-supplied, ill-supported, and ultimately ill-fated Confederate foray into East Tennessee led by Lieutenant General James Longstreet. There was one significant problem for Grant though: he deemed it necessary to have a person accompany him on this trip who was capable of sending and receiving enciphered dispatches.[i]

Enter Samuel Beckwith, a telegraphic cipher clerk with the U.S. Military Telegraph Corps (USMTC) and assigned to Grant. The USMTC, established October 1861, was one of two Federal army signaling operations during the Civil War; the other being the Signal Corps (not officially established until March 1863). The USMTC leveraged the existing commercial telegraph systems for the War Department to facilitate communications between Federal armies in the field and Washington. The USMTC operated independently from military control, with its personnel makeup consisting of civilian telegraph operators and some supervisory personnel with military commissions from the Quartermaster Department, all under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War.   

As events turned out, Beckwith came to be so closely associated with Grant that other staff officers nicknamed him “Grant’s Shadow.” Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who oversaw the USMTC and always kept a tight hold on its operations, intended for Beckwith to accompany Grant wherever he went so that the Major General could always rely on the clerk to facilitate secret communications between him and the War Department in Washington. By January 1864, these particular communications were enciphered using “a new and very complicated cipher,” as then-General-in-Chief of all Union armies, Major General Henry W. Halleck characterized it.[ii]


Captain Samuel Beckwith, the USMTC cipher clerk known as "Grant's Shadow," in his later years. (Photo: Library of Congress)

The USMTC cipher system leveraged what were commonly known during the Civil War as “route ciphers.” In an article published in September 1889, a former USMTC operator, John Emmet O’Brien, concisely described how the route cipher worked: “The principle of the cipher consisted in writing a message with an equal number of words in each line, then copying the words up and down the columns by various routes, throwing in an extra word at the end of each column, and substituting other words for important names and verbs.” In 1960, the dean of modern American cryptologists, William F. Friedman, analyzed the USMTC cryptosystem and concluded that the writing, copying, and use of a cipher book to apply a prearranged route to transcribe the plaintext into a cipher message qualified it to be a called a cipher. That said, Friedman maintained that the addition of “arbitraries” to the USMTC cryptosystem—“words arbitrarily assigned to represent the names of persons, geographic points, important nouns, and verbs, etc.”—actually entitled the system to be more precisely characterized as a code system comprised of “cipher and code processes.”[iii]  

That said, Grant’s problem, as he recognized it, was that his Knoxville trip not only required he keep a skilled telegraphic operator in Nashville—the relay chokepoint for secret dispatches between him and the War Department—but that he also bring along a capable operator to send and receive enciphered messages from Knoxville. He could not have Beckwith in both Knoxville and Nashville, so Grant did what might be considered the next logical thing under less secretive circumstances and told his “shadow” to remain in Nashville, while instructing him to simply hand over a copy of the complicated “Washington cipher” to a person Grant trusted and believed capable of quickly learning how to handle enciphered messages. That person turned out to be Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock of the Corps of Engineers and a member of Grant’s staff.

Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock, the officer who was handed an unauthorized copy of the "Washington Ciper." (Photo: Library of Congress)

Yet, as events turned out, Grant’s plan was neither simple to implement nor compliant with War Department instructions. For one, Beckwith initially refused to comply with Grant’s request to give a copy of the cipher book and key to Comstock. According to Grant, the clerk told him “his orders from the War Department were not to give it [the cipher book and key] to anyone –the commanding general or any one else.” Following this rebuttal, a tense, stand-off ensued between Beckwith and Grant, whereby according to the Division commander, “I told him I would see whether he would [give up the book and key] or not. He said that if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished.” Finally, as Grant later recounted, Beckwith “[saw] that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order” and ultimately “yielded” upon recognizing that no one from the War Department was present to support his refusal.[iv]

Though Grant unsurprisingly came out the victor in this stand-off with the cipher clerk, his desired outcome was certainly not the end of the matter. Soon enough, word got back to USMTC leadership, Stanton, and Halleck about what had transpired.

Between January 20 and February 4, 1864, a steady flurry of messages was traded between Grant and Halleck—perhaps more truthfully stated, between Grant and Stanton, with Halleck as intermediary—whereby the Division commander was asked to justify his actions before ultimately being reprimanded. After explaining what happened and attempting to reassure Halleck that “I shall be as cautious as I possibly can, that improper persons do not get the key to official correspondence,” Grant moved on to protesting what he deemed to be “interference” from Colonel Anson Stager, the Superintendent of the USMTC and essentially Stanton’s deputy. Shortly after learning Beckwith had conceded defeat and intended to hand over the cipher to Comstock, Stager sent the following dispatch to Captain Samuel Bruch, the assistant superintendent of Grant’s Mississippi Division: “Beckwith must not instruct anyone in the cipher. An order will be issued and sent to you on this subject.”

Seeing Grant characterize his dispatch to Bruch as “interference,” Stager determined to defend his actions and wrote Halleck on January 21. Stanton’s deputy for the USMTC emphasized his belief “that the request of the staff officer for copy of the cipher was without General Grant’s authority,” while reminding Halleck, “The Secretary of War recently issued that the operators for this duty should be held responsible for strict privacy in its use….The new cipher was arranged with a view of being used by telegraph experts, and it is believed cannot be used with any success by others than telegraphers.” Stager further drew attention to his impression that “a great number of errors have been made by staff officers working ciphers, owing to their lack of experience in telegraphic characters, and it is believed that greater accuracy can be secured by placing ciphers in the hands of experts selected for this duty.” Once again stressing that the Washington cipher “arranged for General Grant should not be known to any other party,” Stager vented that he was “exceedingly mortified” and suffered from an “anxiety” about letting Beckwith continue on with his operator duties under Grant.

Colonel Anson Stager, Superintendent of the USMTC. (Photo: Library of Congress)

With Stager’s views in hand and undoubtedly upon informing and consulting the hot-tempered Edwin M. Stanton, Halleck prepared Grant’s reprimand, which landed on the Division commander’s desk on January 22. Grant was informed that in complying with his request, Beckwith “disobeyed the Secretary and has been dismissed.” Perhaps relaying some of Stanton’s fury, Halleck went further and intimated that Beckwith actually “should have gone to prison,” while repeatedly reminding Grant that Stanton “takes the personal supervision and direction of the military telegraphs” with the “telegraphic operators receiv[ing] their instructions directly from the Secretary of War.” These instructions “should not be interfered with except under very extraordinary circumstances,” Halleck declared. Adding insult to injury, Halleck used Grant’s own word “interference” against him, pronouncing that it was not Stager, but Comstock (and by extension, Grant) who “interfered with the orders of the War Department,” while reminding Grant (again with it being hard not to hear echoes of Stanton behind this verbiage) that Stager was no less than the “confidential agent of the Secretary of War, and directs all telegraphic matters under his orders.” Finally, Grant was informed that because of this unauthorized disclosure, the Secretary of War ordered an entirely new cipher created “which is to be communicated to no one, no matter what his rank, without his [Stanton’s] special authority.”    

Grant replied in an apologetic and gracious manner on February 4, making it amply clear that his primary focus was on restoring Beckwith to his cipher clerk duties. “I will state that Beckwith is one of the best of men. He is competent and industrious,” Grant highlighted, before putting the blame for the error on himself and not Beckwith: “In the matter for which he has been discharged, he only obeyed my orders and could not have done otherwise than he did and remain….His position is important to him and a better man cannot be selected for it. I respectfully ask that Beckwith be restored.” Grant’s compassionate response was a testament to his paramount leadership abilities. Indeed, just less than a month after the conclusion of this trying episode, Grant was promoted to lieutenant general, the first U.S. Army officer to hold that rank since George Washington. For the remainder of the war, Grant would command all Union armies.[v]

As for Beckwith, he was restored to his position on February 14 and continued on as “Grant’s shadow” until the end of the war, rising to the rank of captain in the 11th New York Infantry. Significantly, Beckwith was the first telegrapher to transmit news of John Wilkes Booth’s whereabouts as authorities searched for him following the assassination of Abraham Lincoln on April 14, 1865.[vi]


Notes

[i] Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, 397-398.

[ii] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington D.C. 1880-1901), Series 1, vol. 32, pt. 2, 172; Hereafter cited as OR. All references are to Series 1 unless otherwise noted; The Friedman Legacy: A Tribute to William and Elizebeth Friedman, 3rd Edition, (Center for Cryptologic History: National Security Agency, 2006), 58-59.

[iii] John Emmet O’Brien, M.D., Telegraphing in Battle: Reminiscences of the Civil War, (Scranton, PA, 1910), 87; The Friedman Legacy, 58-59. 

[iv] Grant, Personal Memoirs, 397-398. 

[v] OR 32/2: 150, 161, 172-173, 323

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